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STATE OF UTAH,

vs.

Appeal from the Judgment of tile
First Judicial District of the State of.
County of Cache, the Honorable
/udge, presiding.

CRAIG CARLSEN
P. 0. Box 250
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

CRAIG CARLSEN,

12116

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict of guilty to a charge of Grand Larceny, rendered in
the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State
of Utah, in and for the County of Cache, the Honorable
VeNoy Christoffersen, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with grand
larceny. The jury found upon the evidence that appellant
was guilty as charged. The court sentenced appellant to
the statutory period, the sentence to run concurrent with
present sentence being served for prior conviction on a
separate charge.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the verdict and judgment of
the court below should be affirmed, and that the case should
be remanded for sentencing consistent with the laws of
Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 19, 1968, Mr. Ted Wilson, the owner of
the Cache Finance and Thrift, was sitting behind the counter in his place of business. A man came into the business
place and grabbed a display plaque containing $1,650.00
and fled. Ted Wilson jumped over the counter and pursued
the thief. Mr. Wilson chased appellant down the street in
a direction west from the business place. Mr. Wilson apprehended appellant (Trial Tr. 21-23).
A complaint was immediateb' issued, wherein Ted Wilson did say that appellant committed the crime of grand
larceny ( R. 1) .
Arraignment proceeding was conducted December 24,
1968, at which time defendant expressed desire for a preliminary hearing, which hearing was set for January 29,
1969. On date set for preliminary hearing, appellant waived
the hearing and was bound over to the District Court to
answer the charge of grand larceny (R. 4).
An information accusing appellant of grand larceny
was filed March 4, 1960 (R. 10).
On March 10, 1969, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge of grand larceny. Trial was set for June 26, 1969
(R. 87).

There were at least two other charges being processed
against appellant while the grand larceny charge was pending (Tr. 3).
The fact there were several charges pending simultaneously against appellant had some effect on the pace that
the case at bar was expedited.
One of the cases against appellant came on for sentencing June 9, 1969. Counsel for appellant requested psychiatric evaluation of appellant. The court then vacated
the date June 26, 1969 - which had been set for the grand
larceny trial (Tr. 7).
On June 25, 1969, the matter came on for further proceeding. Because of consideration of the psychiatric posture
of appellant, the grand larceny case was continued until
July 18, 1969 (Tr. 10) (R. 89).
On July 18, 1969, the court continued the matter to
July 28, 1969. The further stay was granted on the grounds
that the inquiry into the mental condition of appellant was
not concluded (Tr. 14).

The Court was very upset that the doctors were not
more cooperative on the matter (Tr. 14, 15).
On August 11, 1969, the matter came on for further
proceedings. The matter was continued to August 14, 1969.
On August 14, 1969, the court announced that appellant was sane to stand trial. Sentence was imposed for
some separate charges - not having to do with the Cache
County Finance Co. theft. The court then said of the mat-
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ters concerning the Cache County Finance Company theft,
"they remain pending" (Tr. 26).
On November 7, 1969, appellant, while serving prison
sentence, filed request for final disposition of the charges
pending against him (R. 14).
On November 17, 1969, the grand larceny case was
remanded to city court for a preliminary hearing. At the
preliminary hearing which was conducted December 16,
1969, appellant was bound over to the District Court for
trial (R. 8).
A second information accusing defendant of grand
larceny was filed December 23, 1969 (R. 20).

On January 5, 1970 arraignment proceeding was conducted. Appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial was set for
January 7, 1970 (R. 96).
On January 7, 1970, the jury was present and State's
attorney was ready for the trial. Defense attorney asked
for a dismissal on the grounds that appellant had not been
afforded a speedy trial (R. 97). The court then continued
the matter - on its own motion - to consider the motion
of appellant (Trial Tr. 9).
On February 17, 1970, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied and the trial was set for April 8, 1970 (R.
33). The judge stated good reasons existed for continuing
the trial (Trial Tr. 10). Two of the reasons being that defense attorney had been appointed as prosecutor and that
the calendar was crowded.
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Trial was conducted before a jury on April 9, 1970.
The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty
of grand larceny as charged in the information (R. 79).
Defendant was thereafter sentenced, the sentence to run
concurrently with his present sentence (R. 81).
During the trial, appellant objected to the receipt of
the plaque containing the four bills into evidence on the
grounds that there had not been shown a continuity of
possession (Trial Tr. 85).
Going back to the beginning, after appellant was apprehended IJy Mr. Wilson, the display plaque, which contained a $1000.00 bill, a $500.00 bill, a $100 bill, and a
bill was found lying on the ground near where appellant was apprehended. A police officer testified that he
took pictures of the plaque while it was lying on the ground,
and that he thereafter took custody of the plaque. The officer took measurements of the plaque and serial numbers of
the IJills (Trial Tr. 58, 59). The plaque was turned over
to the bank, and a receipt was given to the officer (Trial
Tr. 60).
At the request of Mr. Wilson, on June 25, 1969, the
court ordered that the plaque be given back pending trial
of the case (R. 13). However, before owner took the plaque
away, a police office took more pictures of it (Trial Tr.
77).

The plaque was offered as State's exhibit number one.
The court admitted it (Trial Tr. 86).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN BRINGING DEFENDAN'f TO TRIAL APRIL 9, 1970, BECAUSE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-51-1, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-2, AND
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-65-1 THE COURT
GRANTED REASONABLE AND NECESSARY
CONTINUANCE FOR GOOD CAUSE AND SUFFICIENT REASON SHOWN.
Right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right secured
by the Sixth Amendment and applies to States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Klupfer v. North Carolina, 386
u. s. 213 (1967).
But not all delays are inconsistent with the right to
a speedy trial. The United States Supreme Court recently
stated:
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It
does not preclude the rights of public justice. [Citation omitted. l Whether delay in completing a prosecution ...
to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances .. ·
The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive[.]
[Citation omitted.] [T]he essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed." [Citation omitted.] United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120
(1966).
In Ewell, Id., the defendants were charged, arrested,
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and convicted for particular conduct. Their convictions
\iere later vacated on the grounds the original indictments
had not been sufficient. Fresh arrests and fresh complaints
were made. The court stated ·'that the passage of 19 months
!Jet ween the original arrests and the hearings on the later
indictments [does not demonstrate] a violation of the Sixth
Amenument's guarnntee of a speedy trial."
Thus, the mere passage of time does not amount to
denial of a speedy trial. To secure defendant's right to
h<we bis case brought expeditiously before the court, our
St< .te has enacted statutes requiring dismissal of a case
"·here it is not brought to trial within a certain period, unll'ss good cause is shown for a delay or continuance. The
appellant has pointed out three of these statutes in his
brief, to wit: Utah Code Ann. § 77-51-1(2), Utah Code
Ann. 77-65-1 & -2; and§ 77-1-8 (6).
1

In support of his contention that his case should be dismissed under Utah Code Ann. § 77-51-1, the appellant cites
State v. Endsley, 57 Pac. 430, 19 U. 478 ( 1899). The court
in that case stated that the intent of the legislature was to
secure a speedy trial by imposing a time limit, in the abse11 cp, of good cause being shown for delay.
In State v. Mathis, 319 P. 2d 134, 7 U. 2d 100 (1957),
\1-hich appellant positively cites, the Utah Court was in
accord that the limitations in Section 77-51-1 are maximums,
unless good cause for continuance exists. The granting of
continuance will not be disturbed unless there is plain abuse
of court's discretion.
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Furthermore, it is provided by statute that a continuance is tolerable. Where defendant is not charged nor tried
as provided in Section 77-51-1, "and sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may order the action to be continued
from term to term ... " Utah Code Ann. § 77-51-2 (1953).
Respondent submits that the continuances granted by
the court were based upon good cause and sufficient reason.
In the early stages of the life of this case, there were at
least two other charges pending against appellant. One was
for an incident in another county. Another, a burglary
charge, was based upon the same incident for which appellant was being charged with grand larceny. When one of
the other cases came on for sentencing, appellant's counsel
requested an inquiry into the mental condition of appellant.
The case at bar had been set for trial; the judge vacated
the setting pending trial of the other felony cases, and pending the psychiatric appraisal (Tr. 7).
There were several continuances up to August 14, 1969,
at which time the court announced that appellant had been
determined sane (Tr. 24). The court said of the cases
rising out of Cache County Finance Company theft, that
"they remain pending" (Tr. 26). Sentence was imposed
for some other convictions. While in prison, appellant
requested final disposition of the pending case (R. 14).
Such request is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1,
which provides that when a person is in prison and requests
final disposition of pending charges, he shall be brought
to trial within 90 days:
"Provided, that for a good cause shown in open

!
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court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant
any necessary or reasonable continuance."
Ten days after appellant requested final disposition of
cases pending against him, the grand larceny case was remanded to the city court. Preliminary hearing was conducted and appellant was bound over to the District Court
for trial (R 8). An information accusing defendant of
grand larceny was filed December 23, 1969 (R. 20).
According to State v. Belcher, ______ U. ______ , (Case No.
12077, 1970), the 90 day period does not begin running until the information is filed where only a complaint is pending- when request for final disposition is made. Thus, there
is a question here whether the 90 day period began on November 7, 1969 when appellant's request was filed, or December 23, 1969 when an information was filed. However,
that question is not really critical to case at bar because
either way the case was set for trial within the 90 day
period; trial was set for January 7, 1970 (R. 96). The
matter was continued in order to consider appeUant's motion to dismiss (Trial Tr. 9). The continuance was granted
within the 90 day period. Appellant's motion to dismiss
was denied and trial was set for April 8, 1970 (R. 33). The
court stated that it had good reasons to continue the case
- one being that defense attorney had been appointed to
be a prosecutor and another one being a crowded calendar
(Trial Tr. 10).
In State v. Lozano, 462 P. 2d 710, 23 U. 2d 312 (1969),
the court reversed a conviction on the grounds defendant
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had been denied right to speedy trial. The court on its own
motion had made several continuances with no reason or
cause showing in the record except mere recitals in the
minute entries that there had been good cause.
Case at bar differs from Lozano in several instances.
The major difference being that the judge below did more
than merely indicate he was continuing for good cause - '
he did give sorn.e reasons: for example - time out for insanity hearings; time out becanse defense attorney had
been appointed to be a prosecutor; and time out because
there was a crowded calendar. Furthermore, the Loza;nu
case was based in part on Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8(6),
which provides:
1

"[E ]very defendant in a criminal action unable
to get bail shall be entitled to a trial within thirty
days after arraignment ... "
The defendant in that case was not able to get bond,
thus he came under that provision. Appellant in case at
bar originally had bail, (Tr. 4) but was later sent to the
Utah State Prison on other charges and was not eligible for
bail.
Regarding Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8 ( 6), the Utah
Supreme Court has held that it is directory, not mandatory.
"Where injustice to either party might ensue if the statute
were mandatory through unintended circumstances, neither
should suffer by a dead-line statute like this." In this respect each case must be examined in light of its own particular facts. State v. Rasmussen, 418 P. 2d 134, 18 U. 2d
201, 203 (1966).

1
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POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NUMBER ONE.
Appellant was charged and convicted of the crime of
grand larceny. The property involved v;as a plaque containing a $1,000 bill, a $500.00 bill, a $100.00 bill, and a
$60.00 bill.
The plaque was located on a finance company wall.
Appellant was accused of taking the plaque from the wall
and fleeing with it. Complaining witness chased appellant
down the street and apprehended him. Near the spot where
he was apprehended, the plaque was found on the ground
(Trial Tr. 34). A police officer testified that he saw the
plaque on the ground, and that he took a picture of it (Trial
Tr. 71). The officer also took measurements of the plaque
anti se1·ial numbers of the bills (Trial Tr. 59). That picture
was admitted - without objection - into evidence as plaintiff's exhibit No. 6 (Trial Tr. 71, 76).
Another officer testified that shortly after the theft
took place, the plaque was turned over to the First National
Bank; a bank official gave a receipt therefor (Trial Tr.
60) . In fact, the bank official testified that he gave a description of the contents of the plaque upon his letterhead
over his signature in exchange for the plaque (Trial Tr.
80). The plaque remained at the Bank several months.
At the request of the owner, the court ordered that the
Dlaque be given back to the owner pending trial of the case
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(R. 13). The officer who took pictures of the plaque while

it was on the ground testified that he took pictures of it
when it was returned to owner on June 25, 1969 (Trial Tr. ,
77).
The plaque was offered into evidence as State's exhibit
number one. Defense counsel objected. The court admitted
it (Trial Tr. 86).
Now, the appellant asserts that the court committed
prejudicial error and abused its discretion by admitting the
plaque into evidence.

The statute which appellant cites to substantiate his l(
claim that the court cannot release exhibits from the possession of the court, is directed to custody of exhibits which I
have been admitted as evidence ai a preliminary examination. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-15 (1953). That statute does \I
i
not preclude court from issuing order allowing owner to
withdraw an exhibit pending trial.
Actually, the plaque was not offered for evidence until
December 16, 1969, at which time it was admitted into evidence at the preliminary examination (R. 8).
The owner testified that the plaque had been in his
care, custody, and keeping exclusively up until the date of
the preliminary hearing (Trial Tr. 35) .
The case which appellant cites to uphold his contention
that the plaque was improperly admitted, is a rape-murder
case wherein a pair of men's shorts with paint on them had
been knowingly represented to the court as shorts with
blood on them. Miller v. Pate, 386 U. S. 1 ( 1967).

!
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The appellant attempts to compare the plaque in case
at bar with the men's shorts in Miller. He does this by
showing that the plaque is sometimes referred to as being
constructed of plastic and sometimes of glass. In no man-

11er nor at any time is the nature of the four bills challenged.

l
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The plaque, regardless of what it was made of, was
taken the day of the theft to the bank by a police officer.
The bank official gave a receipt for the bills and designated
the serial numbers (Plaintiff's exhibit No. 10). At the trial
the bank official testified that the plaque shown to him at
the trial contained the currency that had been left at the
bank in safe keeping. The bank official also acknowledged
the letter (receipt) designated as plaintiff's exhibit No. 10
(Trial Tr. 80).
Regardless of what the plaque was constructed of, it
contained currency the day it was taken from the finance
company. It contained the same currency when it was taken
to the bank. It contained the same currency the day it was
offered as evidenee at the trial.
The facts of case at bar do not bring it under the rule
of law in Miller, supra.
CONCLUSION
There was sufficient evidence properly admitted upon
which the jury found that appellant was guilty of grand
larceny as charged.
Respondent respectfully submits that the fact there
were other charges being processed against appellant, the
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fact time was required for sanity examination, the fact the
calendar was crowded, the fact the court took time to con.
sider certain motions made by appellant, and the fact defense counsel was appointed to be a prosecuting attorney,
justified the court in granting continuances.
No prejudice has been shown.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

